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Depression Reconsidered in Fairbairn’s Object Relations Theory
Word count: 5616
Abstract
This paper joins in the psychoanalytic discussion of depression from the perspective of 
Fairbairn’s object relations theory, something Fairbairn did not himself undertake. It aligns 
with Rubens’ view (1994, 1998) that an extension of Fairbairn’s theory beyond Fairbairn’s 
original theory to understand depression is not only advantageous but also necessary. Through 
a revisit of the significant divergences between the classical theory and the relational theory, it 
contextualises the potential of a Fairbairnian framework of depression as distinctive from the 
classical propositions. This paper complicates psychoanalytic knowledge of the nature of 
depression in response to the relational turn, concluding that, framed in Fairbairn’s system, 
depression should be understood as an actively organised psychic manoeuvre to defend against 
changes to the endopsychic structure, and most importantly, against the disintegration of a 
particular sense of self sponsored by internal object relationships.
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Introduction 
Following ‘the relational turn’ (Clarke, et. al., 2008), psychoanalytic work has become 
increasingly concerned about generating a conceptual space to reconceive psychopathology in 
the conjuncture between the intrapsychic and the inter-subjective. The paradigm shift can be 
seen as partly heralded by a renewed interest in Fairbairn’s object-relations formulation of the 
human mind (Ogden, 2010), which sees the unconscious processes as occurred in response to 
the actual relational experiences in the social reality. Fairbairn’s brazen objection to the 
systematic categorisation of libidinal aims into developmental stages, as proposed by the drive 
theory, enabled him to develop his own model of human mind that places the unconscious 
conflicts in their relational contexts. 
We are by nature relationship-seeking, or in Fairbairn’s term “object-seeking” 
(Fairbairn, 1946). This realisation led him to shift away from the one-person psychology that 
characterises much of drive theory, towards developing his own rendition of object relations 
theory that examines the relational history with significant others and ways in which they 
define and construct the individual’s personality encompassing a sense of identity and 
relational configurations. Self, or selfhood, in Fairbairn’s relational theory, should be 
understood as being dynamically constituted and defined by the social relationships one has, 
remembers, desires, and creates (Rubens, 1994: 153). We seek a sense of relatedness with 
significant others, through which a sense of “who am I in relation to you” forms and sediments 
into the core of one’s being and idiosyncratic expressions of selfhood. If “classical theory 
emphasizes defenses against drive”, as Merton Gill (1995) succinctly concludes, then 
“relational theory emphasizes defenses against altering patterns of interpersonal relationships” 
(Gill, 1995; cited in Layton, 2008: 2). The divergence of relational psychoanalysis from 
classical psychoanalysis clearly marks a sharp contrast on what is at the core of the psychic 
pain that triggers the need for psychic defence by human subjects. It is in this regard, I believe, 
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that thinking through Fairbairn’s object-relations theory can offer a interpersonal frame of 
reference for thinking about the mechanism of depression, as distinct from drive theory’s 
centring of the “relief of libidinal tension” (Fairbairn, 1946: 30) proposed by the more orthodox 
Freudian and Kleinian lineages of thought.   
However even though Fairbairn’s theory has been recognised as a fundamental force in 
initiating a paradigm shift “from instinct to self” (Birtles & Scharff, 1994), within 
psychoanalytic thinking, to date there exists a scarcity of references to his work in 
understanding the complex psychic mechanism of depression. Many contemporary authors 
have drawn from object-relations theory in discussing depression (c.f. Goldberg, 1975; Gaylin, 
1983; Summers, 1994; Lubbe, 2011). Yet most of these literatures have not given Fairbairn 
much consideration on depression. Lubbe (2011), for example, in Object Relations in 
Depression: A Return to Theory, devoted only a few pages to discussing Fairbairn, whilst the 
classical theories enjoy still more theoretical engagement. Summers’ (1994) work, Object 
Relations Theories and Psychopathology: A Comprehensive Text, engages with Fairbairn’s 
theory more: he made Fairbairn’s theory his first chapter and succinctly summarised 
Fairbairn’s conception of psychopathology. However, to its great disadvantage Summers 
adopted Fairbairn’s own unclear, if not unhelpful, theoretical distinction between schizoid 
pathology and depressive pathology, reflected in an imbalanced discussion of the two in his 
chapter. 
The minimal amount of engagement with Fairbairn on the subject of depression in the 
existing psychoanalytic literature can be seen as a direct result of Fairbairn’s gradual loss of 
interest in the psychological condition, which led to a subsequent lack of a distinctive 
theoretical framework of depression. Despite his many original theoretical formulations, such 
as “object-relatedness” (1946) and “endopsychic structure” (1944), Fairbairn devoted little 
space to depression; his mentions of depression/depressive personality in his 1940 and 1941 
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papers were all he had to say about it (Rubens, 1998). It is unclear why Fairbairn lost interest 
in depression. His vague and at times confusing differentiation between schizoid pathology 
and depressive pathology adds much to the difficulties, if not reluctance, for later scholars to 
consider his views in making sense of depression. 
On the subject of depression, Fairbairn initially took his theoretical departure from 
Melanie Klein, and inherited Klein’s ideas of “positions” (paranoid-schizoid, depressive) and 
internalized objects (Rubens, 1994: 151). This influence from classical Kleinian thinking 
gradually became faint as he became increasingly aware of the irreconcilable divergences 
between them. Even though Fairbairn did not devote himself to developing a distinct theory of 
depression I believe that his original theoretical formulations have the potential to develop a 
unique line of thought on depression, as his theory has proved to be important and crucial in 
contemporary psychoanalytic thinking on psychic process and defence. It is in this sense that I 
agree with Ogden (2010) and Clarke (2018) that Fairbairn’s theory would always remain an 
un-finished project; but paradoxically, it is in what he left out unsaid and its theoretical 
ambiguity that generates the capacious potential for multiple interpretations and later 
extensions on his original thinking. Rubens (1994, 1998), the first scholar to extend Fairbairn’s 
theory in rethinking depression, puts forward a Fairbairnian framework of depression that 
Fairbairn himself never took forward. In this paper I will largely incorporate the theoretical 
input contributed by Rubens (1994, 1998).
Moreover, I seek to contextualise the potential of a Fairbairnian framework of 
depression through a revisit of some significant divergences between classical theory and 
relational theory on their propositions on the nature of the self and roots of unconscious 
conflicts in relation to psychic defence. I agree with Ogden (1989), who points out that it is not 
only impossible to appreciate Klein’s work without having understood Freud’s work, but it is 
also impossible to understand Freud without having read Klein’s work because Klein’s theory 
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expands and realizes some of the potentials that were latent in Freudian theory. I feel it is 
necessary to say that the same could be said of Fairbairn; that it is impossible to understand the 
full implications of what he has achieved, the potential for understanding human psychology 
his theory brings, without contextualising his theory against what Freudian-Kleinian instinct 
theory has established. Finally, I will bring a closure by remarking on the clinical potentialities 
reconceptualising depression from Fairbairnian lens could bring in response to the relational 
turn.
From Freud, Klein to Fairbairn: A Paradigm Shift Towards The Social Reality
Joseph Schwartz (1999) in his critically acclaimed text Cassandra's Daughter: A 
History of Psychoanalysis presents us with a comprehensive study of the development of 
psychoanalysis as a divergent discipline and a simple message - in psychoanalysis, the 
development of a theory needs to be appreciated alongside an understanding of its time, of its 
un-stemmable unconscious origin deeply rooted in the individual theorist’s personal, cultural 
and political contexts. Fairbairn, who had not experienced the tremendous ethnic violence that 
propelled Freud and Klein to leave their homes in a haste to the foreign land of Britain, made 
him less inclined to see destructiveness as innate (I will return to this later). But what he did 
experience in personal and professional spheres was a life-long deprivation of relatedness. A 
rare theorist to radically challenge Freudian theory beyond what the dominant psychoanalytical 
climate of the time could allow, Fairbairn’s work was one that not many could relate to. The 
lack of appreciation of what he had professionally devoted to was acknowledged by himself 
with great disappointment, which was only to be compounded by the recurrent 
misinterpretations and dismissal of his work by leading figures in the then psychoanalytic circle 
such as Winnicott and Khan (ibid: xvii). For almost half a century Fairbairn remained relatively 
unknown (Birtles & Scharff, 1952: xi).
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  Personal relationships provided little solace. His marriage was saturated with constant 
relational strains with his wife, who disapproved of some of his work, and generally refrained 
from affective expression to those around her. The experience of relational estrangement was 
life long, extending from growing up with ‘strongly moralistic’ (Scharff & Scharff, 2005: 180) 
and highly religious parents, who championed the value of discipline over relational closeness. 
Not having what one so desperately needed, a relationship that could affirm one’s worth and 
reciprocate with one’s need for affection, Fairbairn (1944) later theorised, reduced the person 
“to a state of worthless, destitution or beggardom. His sense of his own value is threatened; 
and he feels bad in the sense of inferior (pp.  113, italics original).”
It is possible that his own relational history was why his work was concerned more with 
the schizoid way of coping (Rubens, 1998) - the psychic organization through an internal 
rupture of splitting into the good and bad objects, which, to Fairbairn, occurs more as a result 
of the traumatic experience of the relational needs not being sufficiently acknowledged and 
met and less as driven by the unbearable libidinal tension caused by the physiological 
gratification not being satisfied when arisen. Fairbairn’s object relation theory puts forward a 
relational-structural model, which reformed psychoanalytic thinking on primal needs of 
personhood and challenged the long-established Freudian drive-structure model (Greenberg & 
Mitchell, 1983; Grotstein & Rinsley, 1994). It is fair to say that Fairbairn was the first to 
systematically conceive the concept of the development of personality based on a relational-
structural model in which the internal object relationships are constituted and structured based 
on the relational matrix with external others. Moreover, it has been argued that Fairbairn’s term 
“object-seeking” is an elusive one. Mitchell (1998), in response to Greenberg’s (1991) 
argument on the subject, suggests that the term object-seeking does not have any theoretical 
signification if read literally, as all psychoanalytical theories since Freud depict humans’ needs 
as seeking an object. The question, Mitchell (1998) thinks, should be “what are they seeking 
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objects for?” (pp. 116). For Fairbairn, the others are theorised consistently as being sought for 
the “establishment of satisfactory relationships” (1946: 30-31). In other words, objects are 
sought in order to meet the need to establish and maintain a sense of relatedness with others 
who need to be engaged in a personally meaningful way (Mitchell, 1998: 66-80). In the 
relational context, we cannot derive a sense of relatedness without it being mutually enacted 
with the other. Therefore, in Fairbairn’s formulation, object-need is in itself a recognition and 
expression of our human inter-dependence. The social dimension of the self and the need for 
relationships with real external objects was seen as the most crucial need in the development 
of the self in psychoanalytic thinking for the first time.  The critical re-orientation is one from 
one-person psychology to two (or more) person psychology, redefining the basic human nature 
and its ultimate motivations1. It is, hence, quite clear that Fairbairn’s development of the self 
differs fundamentally to that of classical theory. Although Fairbairn kept the term “ego” in his 
writing, his meaning of the term should be seen as referring to the entirety of the psychic self 
that is inseparable from its desires, needs and on-going experiencing in the internal and external 
reality. 
For Fairbairn, we are involved in relationships as soon as we are born, and the content 
of the internal objects are based on the real experience with the real external objects, albeit 
often fragmented in reconfiguration. Furthermore, our psychological experience with our 
primary objects, commonly the mother, can be divided into either satisfactory or unsatisfactory 
emotional terrains. The satisfactory experience comes from the sense of feeling loved, cared 
about and needs nurtured, contributing to the creation of the “ideal object” 2. An ideal object is 
1 There are debates around whether Fairbairn’s work should be seen as a re-orientation of 
Freud’s drive theory, as his notion of the relation-seeking individual can also be interpreted 
as intrinsically an impulsive being but with different motivational aims. However, the debate 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
2 As Skolnick (2014) argues, albeit confusingly termed, Fairbairn’s usage of the “ideal 
object” bears no resemblance to the term “idealized object” that often carries a pathological 
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treated as an accepted object and thereafter assimilated3 by the child into the central ego - the 
primary, dynamic agency of the “I” that instigates and constructs the sub-systems within the 
psyche based on its own subjective experience with the important others (Hoeft, 2009: 75). If 
the positive interactions are abundantly received in the child’s relationships with her caregivers, 
the positive relational memories of love, trust, empathetic attunement associated with the ideal 
objects can develop into a constant source from which the central ego retrieves for self-soothing 
and self-reassurance. The progressive outcome is a powerful and stable central ego more 
capable of managing the interpersonal circumstances that grow in their demands and 
complexity as the child develops (Celani, 2007: 124).   
Fairbairn and the Psychopathology of the Self
With regard to psychopathology, Fairbairn’s disagreement with the Freudian-
Abrahamian line of thought relates to the latter’s view that psychopathology is primarily based 
on the maturation of the bodily zones and the satisfaction of its corresponding impulses. Instead, 
Fairbairn sees emotional maturation of the self as requiring essentially the quality and the 
complexities of the relationships with the objects and believes that it is the parent’s adequate 
responsiveness to the child’s relational needs that predispose her to later mental stability. Like 
Klein, Fairbairn began his theory of endopsychic structure (1944) with a focus on the 
mothering, and the limitation of which, rendering it capable of both satisfying and frustrating 
the baby. What essentially satisfies the baby, to Fairbairn, lies more in the mother’s 
responsiveness towards the baby’s emotional needs of being held and not just the biological 
needs of being fed, whilst the lack of it frustrates. The intolerable tension created by maternal 
meaning in psychoanalytic thinking. Fairbairn’s ideal object however is believed to be, by 
meaning, closer to Winnicott’s “good-enough object” exempt from repression. (pp. 251). 
3 On the debates as to whether Fairbairnian good object is internalized or not, I adopt Rubens 
(1994) argument that good objects can be internalized but are never repressed nor structured 
into endopsychic structures as are the unsatisfactory bad objects.  
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responsiveness and non-responsiveness fuels ambivalence with which the infant copes through 
the primal defence of splitting and repression. The purpose of this is two-fold. First of all, the 
infant seeks to control the frustrating object (non-responsiveness) through internalizing it, 
taking upon the badness from the object and store it inside of one’s own body. Secondly, the 
infant seeks to preserve the tie with the external object, either good or bad, so as to avoid 
separation anxiety from which the self continues to depend. The psychic functioning of 
splitting and internalisation, albeit defensive by nature, is what Fairbairn sees as the root to a 
range of psychopathologies. 
As mentioned previously, the Fairbairnian baby is essentially one that is wired for 
relatedness with objects. The development of self takes root in the relational history, which 
gives rise to a sense of self in relation to others. If unsatisfactory relational experience, such as 
through the deprivation of the experience of relatedness, is frequently experienced in the social 
reality, then the unconscious process of splitting and internalisation would be much replied 
upon in order to mould oneself to interpersonal demands. In negotiating a sense of relatedness, 
the external objects need to be kept as good so they can be experienced as relationally available. 
Whilst, their badness, “too disruptive and threatening to the on-going relationship with the 
object to remain in awareness” (Celani, 2007: 123)”, needs to be internalised into the body of 
the child so he can exert control over it. 
Fairbairn terms this mechanism “moral defence” (1943: 65) famously saying, 
It is better to be a sinner in a world ruled by God than to live in a world ruled by
the Devil. A sinner in a world ruled by God may be bad; but there is always a
certain sense of security to be derived from the fact that the world around is good (1943: 
66-67)
Moral defence depicts how a child seeks to preserve the external harmony with others, 
albeit illusory, at the cost of his internal integrity (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983: 171). 
Moreover, the unsatisfactory object can be split into “exciting” and “rejecting” part-
objects (the essential part of the object that is recognized as a whole on its own), which are 
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fundamentally bad objects in Fairbairn’s view. Exciting objects and rejecting objects each 
represent the intolerable elements of the over-exciting and over-rejecting aspects of the original 
object. The exciting object is the aspect of the object that is felt as teasing, promising, and 
alluring, however it over-excites the child without being able to fulfil the needs it powerfully 
aroused. The rejecting object, on the other hand, is the aspect of the object that relates to the 
child in a depriving, abusive, or neglectful manner (Celani, 2007: 123). Both objects are 
intolerably frustrating to the child, so they are repressed4.
I particularly appreciate Fairbairn’s pioneering contribution in introducing the concept 
of ego-splitting into psychoanalytic thinking (Padel, 1991: 593). This distinguished him from 
Klein on the matter of repression as Fairbairn believes that repression of the bad objects brings 
about repression of the aspects of the self that correspond to, and at the core of its pathological 
nature, allies with the internalized exciting and rejecting bad objects. Fairbairn terms these 
subsidiary selves the ‘libidinal ego’ and ‘anti-libidinal ego’. The subsidiary selves are split off 
from the central ego and repressed due to its libidinal attachment to the internalized bad objects. 
The libidinal ego is the part of the self that identifies with and attaches to the exciting 
object, imprisoned therefore in the perpetually desperate pursuit of the exciting object for love, 
and the reciprocation it was once promised. The libidinal ego craves in dependency a painful 
longing for the exciting object, as Gomez (1997) describes, like someone waiting endlessly by 
the phone for the lover who had promised to call, but who they know from experience will not 
(pp. 62). The anti-libidinal ego is the part of the self that identifies with and is attached to the 
rejecting object, which represents the original aggressor, and becomes the repository of all the 
hatred and destructiveness accumulated and stored up as a result of the frustration of libidinal 
longing (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983: 166). The anti-libidinal ego, due to identification with 
4 Repression, in Fairbairn’s (1944) view, “originates primarily as a defense against “bad” 
internalized objects (and not against impulses …)” (pp. 93)
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the depriving and withdrawing aspects of the rejecting object, berates the intensely needy 
libidinal ego as pathetic and a wimp, and rejects the seductive exciting object as worthless and 
undesirable. At the same time the anti-libidinal ego denies brazenly that she has any needs or 
desires for others, positioning herself as “the enemy to hope, particularly of hope for anything 
meaningful with other people” (ibid). The powerful hate and aggression within the bond of the 
rejecting object and anti-libidinal ego set off a further dynamite of repression, attacking the 
bond of the exciting object and libidinal ego. It is in essence a repression (commanded by the 
subsidiary configurations) on top of another repression (by the central ego) - a phenomenon 
Fairbairn (1944) originally termed “internal saboteur” and changed to “secondary repression” 
(pp. 108). 
At its core, what is internalized into the endopsychic structure are not solely “objects”, 
but a series of dynamic “object-relations” corresponding to the traces of the child’s lived 
experiences of relational history. If the external others continue to be experienced as unloving 
and unsatisfying, the need to protect and control the bad objects persists and intensifies, leading 
to a repetitive circle of splitting and repression that strengthens the endopsychic structure and 
weakens the central ego. 
Depression Reconsidered in Fairbairn’s Object Relations Theory
As mentioned early on, Fairbairn initially inherited Klein’s ideas of paranoid-schizoid 
and depressive positions and of internalized objects in thinking about depression. Over time, 
however, the Kleinian influence became faint as the divergences between their thinking 
became irreconcilable. This is mainly due to Klein’s lingering adherence to instinct theory in 
favour of the libidinal impulses particularly in the terms of the internal phantasy. Comparing 
the differences between Fairbairn and Klein, Ogden (2010) notes that Fairbairn consistently 
emphasizes the primacy of the external reality and gives the unconscious phantasy a secondary 
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role, whereas for Klein it is the opposite5 (p. 103). Fairbairn did not resonate with Klein’s 
emphasis on the importance of the depressive position in her thinking. Rather, he gave the 
schizoid state much more weight in his theory and argued that many diagnosed depressives 
were in fact misdiagnosed schizoids (Fairbairn, 1941: 91). This claim had the significant 
consequence of marginalising, and under-theorising, depression in his work. 
Rubens (1998) puts forward a revision of Fairbairn’s original view on depression. He 
extends Fairbairn’s original theory of endopsychic structure and stresses the dynamic 
interaction between the internal object relations and the external relational surrounding. Taking 
into account the influence of the on-going social reality on the internal object-relations, he 
argues that at the heart of depr ssion is a neurotic persistence to maintain and live within the 
established endopsychic structure triggered by the possibility of change in the interpersonal 
environment. The person with depression, as Rubens (1998) contends, is one who persists to 
live in “the stasis in the closed-system of experiencing the world” (p. 222). If nothing has 
changed, nothing could have been lost. The pessimistic avoidance of meaning would be in 
essence a camouflage for such neurotic resistance against any on-going, meaningful interaction 
with those around in the external reality that might interrupt the establishment of the 
endopsychic structure. 
The endopsychic structure provides a home not only for the internalised bad objects but 
also the repressed aspects of self that have realistically experienced and identified with their 
intolerably exciting and rejecting counterparts of the bad object; all together they constitute a 
repressed part of the self and sponsor a substantial part of who one feels one is. Just like a child 
who can bear the bad objects being bad, but not separation from them, or worse, losing them, 
the person with depression cannot let go of his existing endopsychic structure that stores traces 
5 Although this contrast appears irreconcilable, Ogden does not see their differences as 
contradictory, but complimentary, in the way that they enable what Bion (1962) refers to as a 
“binocular vision” in evaluating an individual’s clinical presentation (2010: 103).
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and remnants of relational experiences between parts of the self with his objects. That is, as the 
need to continually reminisce early object relationships persists, any changes are resisted at full 
force, so the ties between the subsidiary selves with the internal objects can be preserved. 
Considering Fairbairn’s concept of “secondary repression”, it would then be overly reductionist 
to see depression as merely a case of anger directed at oneself, at the forsaken object inside, 
when in fact it is a case of aggression being internalized along with the bad object relationships 
into one’s psychic structure, utilized necessarily as a fuel towards further repressing the 
otherwise intolerable resurfacing of the bad objects and their corresponding subsidiary selves.
Forceful avoidance of the external reality brings about taxing consequences on the 
psyche. Fairbairn (1944) observed clinically a sense of “futility”, which he describes as “a 
complete impasse” (pp. 50-51) that “reduces the ego to a state of utter impotence. (ibid)”.  
Although he saw it as distinct from depression6, it has been argued that the sense of futility is 
what would be recognised as one of common clinical presentations of depression in the 
cotemporary sense (Rubens, 1998). Fairbairn explained the phenomenon of futility from his 
perspective of internalization. By internalising the bad objects, an inevitable burden of the 
badness is created on the psychic functioning. It generates in the psyche an unsolvable impasse 
brought to full force by a sense of inferiority of the self at the mercy of the internalises bad 
objects and a sense of illusory superiority derived from the subsidiary selves siding with the 
powerful, ruling, bad objects. The clash between the illusory superiority due to identification, 
and the ever-present inferiority experienced in the central ego from the burden of the bad 
objects, in Fairbairn’s view, damages the integrity of the ego. As this transpires, “the ego 
6 Rubens (1998) argues that, in actual fact, Fairbairn’s differentiation between the sense of 
futility and depression is a result of his own definitional issues; Fairbairn cannot label it as 
depression having assigned depression to a different category. According to Rubens this 
distinction should be revised and the sense of futility should be incorporated into the term 
depression.
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becomes quite incapable of expressing itself; and in so far as this is so, its very existence 
becomes compromised (Fairbairn, 1944: 50-51).” The sense of futility, encompassing feelings 
of helplessness, emptiness, and immobilization, could be seen as resulting from the paralyzing 
frustration in which one fails to reconcile one’s unconscious inner reality and the outside world. 
It is important to note that, Fairbairn (1944) did not approve of Freud and Klein’s 
emphasis on aggression and death instinct as the primary agent that contributes to the 
depressive or melancholic functioning. Rather, he marks down aggression and gives it a 
secondary role, seeing it mainly as a reaction to the frustration caused by the objects, rather 
than the other way around. This is critically different to what Klein proposed on the depressive 
position, that it is guilt-triggered in the wake of aggressive impulses towards the loved object. 
It can therefore be postulated that, guilt, in Fairbairn’s view, does not generate as a result to 
one’s own aggression, but it arises from moral defence of seeing oneself as irredeemably bad 
to preserve any redeeming qualities in the external objects in keeping the relational bond 
(Rubens, 1998). From the operation of moral defense comes the true nature of self-reproach 
and self-abasement that so characterizes depression. Devils must be kept and contained within 
oneself, so that hope to be ruled by God, in a world of meaning and redemption, do not die. 
Hyperactive self-criticism, as also recognized by Freud, and its related phenomenon 
such as low self-esteem or self-depreciation, has been deemed as a common trait underlying 
the depressive phenomenon. I believe that Fairbairn’s account of the internalization of the bad 
object, or moral defence, as a consequence to inadequate parenting, provides one way of 
explaining self-derogatory thinking and behaviours in depression. As noted earlier, Fairbairn 
sees the endopsychic structure as a defence against the intolerable anxiety in the face of one's 
relational needs not being met and the helplessness at the hands of un-dependable others. As 
Fairbairn wrote (1943), through internalization, the individual “take[s] upon the burden of 
badness which appears to reside in his loved objects” (pp. 66); by taking on the badness from 
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the objects, the bad objects can be made good again. It provides a false justification for the 
deprivation and the inadequate treatments on the child’s side, ‘I am treated this way because I 
am bad’. The idealization and excessive investment in the loved-object, as located outside of 
the central ego, inevitably leads to the devaluation of the self. If the mind of a melancholic does 
suffer an engulfment in a harassing sense of injustice, as Freud observed, understood in 
Fairbairn’s term it is the injustice the ego inflicts upon itself by ways of moral defence. To 
Freud, what the melancholic has lost is the narcissistically loved-object, either symbolically or 
environmentally. However, to Fairbairn, what the melancholic has really lost, or more 
accurately, ‘surrendered’, are the elements of self that feel lovable in exchange for a hope for 
love from his objects which he knows from experience would never be truly requited. 
A Fairbairnian depression essentially portrays a psychological crisis of a clash between 
the internal world and the external reality in the wake of changes; change alerts us to 
possibilities of loss and intensifies the unconscious desires to maintain the endopsychic 
structure as the way it is, whilst the reality of the external world comes into conflict with the 
internal relational constellations, i.e. the original bad/unsatisfying object is lost and can no 
longer sponsor the dynamics of the endopsychic structure. This could perhaps explain why an 
individual could spiral down into deep abyss of depression following a change in a positive 
direction, for example when the bad object in reality becomes lost. The common manifestation 
of the depressive pessimism displayed in its inability to change, in a Fairbairnian system can 
be read as a camouflage for its active, by nature neurotic, expression in the form of psychical 
defense against having to deal with changes and the possibility of loss accompanying changes. 
The symptoms of it should be seen as an unconscious expression of the object relationships 
that have been repressed. Depression, reconsidered in Fairbairn’s object relations theory, rather 
than suggesting a lack of psychological resilience in the individual in managing the day-to-day 
reality, is best understood as an actively organized experience, actively and unconsciously by 
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the person as a defence mechanism against changes to the internal object relationships, against 
the disintegration of the sense of self and its subsequent psychic pain. 
Towards a Fairbairnian Conception of Depression: A Conclusive Commentary
Distinct from Freud and Klein, Fairbairn recognises that the structuring of the psyche 
and the deployment of the defence mechanism is organized around the meaningful process of 
defining and expressing the unique sense of selfhood in relation to others. Following Fairbairn, 
the very nature of the selfhood no longer equates with a sole functional director that seeks to 
negotiate amongst id, ego, and superego in order to eliminate the inner tensions unbearably 
aroused by love and hate. It is apparent that both Freud and Klein’s theories are rooted in the 
proposition of there being a common force of the instincts in the face of internal conflicts 
between love and hate, whilst giving little importance to the place of relational experiences 
between the self and the others. For this reason, the nature of the object relationship they 
construed was much narrower than Fairbairn. 
In this paper I have argued that a Fairbairnian depression originates not from the nature 
of libidinal impulses, but from the difficulties experienced in the object relationships. Within 
Fairbairn’s relational thinking, self is an organizing autonomy that, within his own 
psychological capacity, seeks to cope with “a set of social and psychological circumstances” 
(Orbach, 2008: 31) that he or she is born into, desperately trying to alchemize chaos into a 
reality where a sense of relatedness can be obtained time and again, albeit at the cost of psychic 
integrity. This fundamentally challenges the drive theory “that attributes psychopathology to 
developmental arrest” (Layton, 2008: 6).
If we can see the subsidiary selves and the internalized objects as “a cast of characters” 
hosted within the endopsychic structure (Clarke, 2018) replaying internally the patient’s most 
painful relational memories, then we can see the transferential and counter-transferential 
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dynamics as intrinsically expressing the internal relational matrix between subsidiary selves 
and the internalized objects. We can, perhaps, also begin to appreciate any genuine sign of 
depression during the psychotherapeutic treatment by a patient, for it would signify that a sense 
of change must have been detected, but unconsciously, forcefully avoided. 
It is quite likely, therefore, that when the treatment has begun to work, the possibility of change 
may trigger “the defence of depression to forestall or deny that change” (Rubens, 1998).
Depression, in a Fairbairnian sense, is not what needs to be addressed, but the parts of 
the self that are frozen in time living in the era of catastrophe of affective deprivation by an 
impossible object that is “unique, indispensable, irreplaceable” but at the same time “damaging 
– unlovable, captivating (of non-sacrificial love), guilty, and devaluating, narcissistic” (Matos, 
2002: 63). To understand depression through the framework of Fairbairn’s relational thinking 
requires an understanding of how the self relates to others through the established patterns of 
object relationships in the endopsychic structure and how depression ‘serves’ to obstruct the 
on-going process of self-making through engaging with others and the surrounding world in a 
meaningful way. The withdrawal into endopsychic structure in Fairbairn’s theory, the ultimate 
‘room of one’s own’ essentially allows the individual to reminisce the bond with the 
internalised objects and also to hold on tight to the parts of self that identify with the bad objects 
as all together they maintain a significant figment of self-identity in the wake of the clash 
between the internal and the external realties. 
Working from a relational framework sheds some light on the problem of therapeutic 
neutrality. Invoking Orbach (2008), “relationship is influence and affect, or it is not relationship” 
(p. 39). As the patient embarks on the therapeutic journey, the therapist joins in and become 
part of what is being explored, examined and worked on. The therapist, who is experienced not 
only in the patient’s psychic reality but also in the social reality, is ways being pulled towards 
re-enacting certain patterns in response to the “cast of characters” (Clarke, 2018) within the 
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patient’s internal object-relations. In a Fairbairnian sense, an “idiosyncratic elaboration of 
actual relational experience” (Layton, 2009: 2) would be indispensable in working with 
depression, but it would not be sufficient without the practitioner’s consistent relational 
responsiveness towards the patient who needs to be recognised as fundamentally a relational 
being. The therapeutic interaction provides the stage for the patient’s unique relational history 
to be brought to life. The analytic endeavour of listening is to tune in sensitively to the ‘voices’ 
as expressed from a particular endopsychic position in dominance, through which we can begin 
to formulate an understanding from an interpersonal frame of reference that validates the 
presence and influence of the external others then and now (with the therapist being part of the 
picture!), and most importantly their internal counterparts that continue to reign supreme in the 
oppressive, uncaring manner over their loyal subjects of the subsidiary selves eternally caught 
in the depressive impasse of being tantalised but rejected by which they so hopelessly love 
regardless. 
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